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Note
Pharmacist Refusals: Dispensing (With) Religious
Accommodation Under Title VII
Amy Bergquist∗
On Saturday, July 6, 2002, Amanda Renz, a student at the
University of Wisconsin-Stout,1 entered the K-Mart pharmacy
in Menomonie, Wisconsin, to refill her prescription for Loestrin
FE 1/20, an oral contraceptive.2 Renz planned to take the first
dose of the refill the next day,3 and if she were to miss this
dose, she would need to use a substitute form of birth control
for an entire month.4 Neil Noesen, a Roman Catholic, was the
only pharmacist on duty at the pharmacy that weekend.5 He
told her that he would not refill her prescription because he objected to contraceptives on religious grounds.6 Renz asked Noesen where she could go to have her prescription refilled, but he
refused to tell her because he did not want to participate in her

∗ J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1991,
Amherst College. The author thanks Robyn Madson for sharing her story; Joseph Schmitt and Ryan Stai for topic selection advice; Suzanne Thorpe for research assistance; Professor Stephen Befort for substantive feedback on an
earlier draft; Professors Laura Cooper and David Weissbrodt for serving as
mentors; the board and staff of volume 90 of the Minnesota Law Review for
their diligence, thoughtful advice, and commitment to a valuable collective endeavor; and Erik Larson for everything else.
1. See Stacy Forster, Pharmacist Rebuked: He Refused to Refill Birth
Control Prescription, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 14, 2005, at 1 (referring
to Renz by her married name, Amanda Phiede). This story is also described in
Holly Teliska, Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20
BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 229, 229 (2005).
2. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080,
paras. 21–22 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi.gov/
dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm. The court documents refer to the woman as
“AR.” See id. para. 21.
3. See id. para. 24.
4. See id. paras. 42, 44–45.
5. See id. paras. 21, 32.
6. Id. paras. 25–26.
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efforts to receive contraceptives.7 She went to another pharmacy and the pharmacist there attempted to have the prescription transferred by telephone, but Noesen refused to provide
the necessary information.8 Renz went home and telephoned
the assistant store manager, who reported that the store had
been having many problems that day because women were unable to fill their prescriptions.9 The pharmacy did not fill Renz’s
prescription until Monday, July 8.10
Reported incidents of pharmacists refusing to dispense
contraceptives or other prescription medication on religious
grounds are escalating;11 according to one estimate there were
180 refusals nationwide in a six-month period in 2004.12 These
refusals have sparked a national debate about healthcare access, professional ethics, and the definition of abortion.13 Yet
commentators have devoted little attention to the employment
law governing pharmacist refusals.14
As private employers, pharmacies may elect to accommodate the religious beliefs of pharmacists, and a variety of factors may influence this decision. The acute shortage of pharmacists15 may provide an incentive for employers to defer to
7. See id. para. 28.
8. See id. paras. 29–31, 33.
9. See id. para. 34.
10. Id. para. 43.
11. See Rene Sanchez, New Arena for Birth-Control Battle, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), May 3, 2005, at A1; Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of
New Debate: Because of Beliefs, Some Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescriptions, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at A1.
12. See Editorial, Moralists at the Pharmacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005,
§ 4, at 12.
13. See, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of Defining When a
Woman Is Pregnant, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, May 2005, at 7, 10
(reporting that the debate has drawn renewed attention to the issue of when
pregnancy begins and what constitutes an abortion); Adam Sonfield, Rights vs.
Responsibilities: Professional Standards and Provider Refusals, GUTTMACHER
REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 2005, at 7, 7 (observing that issues at stake include
pharmacists’ rights, legal and ethical obligations, and discrimination in health
care access).
14. Scholars have focused on health care access issues and state refusal
clauses. See, e.g., Donald W. Herbe, Note, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a Pharmacist’s Right to Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and
Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 77, 89 (2002) (noting briefly the
“employment ramifications” of pharmacist refusals); Teliska, supra note 1, at
240–41 (criticizing pharmacist refusal clauses for their effect on access to
health care).
15. See Shortage of Pharmacists Takes a Turn for the Worse, CHAIN DRUG
REV. (N.Y.), June 6, 2005, at 246 [hereinafter Shortage of Pharmacists] (dis-
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employees’ religious accommodation requests.16 Some religious
organizations may encourage and support pharmacists who refuse to dispense contraceptives and the pharmacies that accommodate them.17 Facing steep competition from mail-order
drug providers,18 retail pharmacies seek to emphasize their
ability to provide comprehensive customer service and demonstrate their superiority over more impersonal alternatives.19
Independent retail pharmacies, which depend heavily on walkin business,20 may encounter intense economic pressure to ensure that pharmacists fill every prescription without delay.21
Some major drug store chains insist that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act obliges them to accommodate pharmacists who
refuse to dispense on religious grounds.22 In spite of these
cussing a sharp rise in pharmacist vacancies in retail pharmacies).
16. See The Early Show: Karen Brauer, Fired Pharmacist and Gloria
Feldt of Planned Parenthood, Discuss Their Beliefs on Pharmacies Filling Prescriptions for Birth Control Pills (CBS television broadcast Apr. 23, 2001),
available at 2006 LEXIS ALLNWS (“[I]t would be helpful [for pharmacies] to
be practical. There’s now a shortage of pharmacists. . . . There seem to be not
enough pro-choice medical professionals to fulfill the needs or demands of certain women . . . .” (statement of Karen Brauer, chapter leader of Ohio Pharmacists for Life)).
17. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 246 (observing that religious groups are
organizing efforts to monitor and support pharmacist refusals); Moralists at
the Pharmacy, supra note 12 (“[I]f this movement picks up steam, right-to-life
groups in some areas may pressure one pharmacy after another to refuse service . . . .”); cf. Florence A. Ruderman, Editorial, Prescription for Injustice, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A23 (“[O]ther pharmacists may be unwilling to fill
contested prescriptions, out of fear of becoming targets for boycotts or other
hostile actions.”).
18. See Milt Freudenheim, Drugstores Fret as Insurers Demand Pills by
Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A1 (discussing the effects of insurers requiring consumers to fill their prescriptions by mail).
19. See Michael Johnsen, Can Pharmacists Dispense Morality?, DRUG
STORE NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 21, 2005, at 1 (“[T]he chain drug operator . . . has a
vested interest in establishing and maintaining a customer-friendly policy in
what has become an extremely competitive environment.”); ‘Prevent the Switch
in the First Place,’ CHAIN DRUG REV. (N.Y.), May 2, 2005, at 226 (reporting
that customers prefer retail pharmacies over mail-order suppliers “because of
the convenience and the personal relationship they can build with their local
pharmacist”).
20. See ‘Prevent the Switch in the First Place,’ supra note 19, at 226.
21. See Joan E. Allen, New Battleground, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 1997, at 7
(“As an independent pharmacist, you do things above and beyond what a chain
would do.” (quoting Richard E. Kane, the owner of an independent pharmacy)).
22. See, e.g., CVS Sees Its Job as Filling Every Script, CHAIN DRUG REV.
(N.Y.), Aug. 29, 2005, at 1 (noting that CVS senior vice president of store operations made reference to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in describing the company’s policy, which allows pharmacists to refuse to fill contraceptive prescrip-
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claims, the only prominent case in which a pharmacist challenged her termination for refusing to dispense birth control
was dismissed after the employer went bankrupt,23 and courts
have issued “no significant verdicts or appellate decisions on
the subject so far.”24 In 2004 and 2005, several employers reportedly fired pharmacists for refusing to fill prescriptions.25 As
those former employees consider suing,26 and as pharmacists
more frequently refuse to fill prescriptions on religious
grounds,27 it is imperative to determine the extent to which Title VII protects pharmacist refusals.28 May a pharmacy terminate a refusing pharmacist? Could K-Mart dismiss Noesen for
his refusal to fill Renz’s prescription, or would that termination
violate Title VII?
Women are using emergency contraception more frequently,29 and therefore the issue of pharmacist refusals takes

tions “as long as they make certain the customer can receive the medication
when another pharmacist is on duty or at another CVS store”); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., What’s the Matter with Target’s Response,
http://www.saveroe.com/target/response (last visited Mar. 5, 2006 (quoting a
Nov. 14, 2005 e-mail from Target suggesting that the company’s policy of allowing objecting pharmacists to transfer Plan B emergency contraception prescriptions to a different pharmacy is required by Title VII).
23. See Brauer v. K-Mart Corp., Civ. Action No. C-1-99-618 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 30, 2004) (order to close case administratively); see also ‘Morning After’
Misery, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 6, 1999, at B2 (reporting the pharmacist’s reasons for
filing the lawsuit).
24. Correy E. Stephenson, Coming Soon to a Court Near You: Conscience
Clauses, LAW. WKLY., Apr. 25, 2005, at 1.
25. See Steve Barnes, Pharmacists Fired, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at
A18 (reporting that Eckerd Corporation fired three Texas pharmacists for refusing to fill a prescription); Sanchez, supra note 11 (observing that Neil Noesen was fired from a Snyders drug store for allegedly refusing to fill birth control prescriptions).
26. According to one source, “[l]egal action [regarding pharmacist refusals] is still in the formative stages, with several cases pending.” Stephenson,
supra note 24; see also Jo Mannies, ‘Pill’ Dispute Costs Pharmacist Her Job,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2006, at A1 (reporting that in January
2006, one attorney initiated an EEOC complaint and a civil suit on behalf of
four terminated pharmacists).
27. See Sanchez, supra note 11 (indicating that incidents of pharmacists
declining to fill contraceptive prescriptions are on the rise); see also Stein, supra note 11 (quoting a representative of the Christian Legal Society’s Center
for Law and Religious Freedom who stated that the issue is “just beginning to
surface” and that the organization is “on the very front edge of a wave that’s
going to break not too far down the line”).
28. See Johnsen, supra note 19 (noting that the issue “represents a potential legal powder keg for pharmacy employers”).
29. See Rachel K. Jones et al., Contraceptive Use Among U.S. Women Hav-
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on greater urgency. Because some pharmacists consider emergency contraception to be an abortifacient, they are more likely
to refuse to fill prescriptions for the drug.30 Moreover, the timesensitive nature of the drug31 means that pharmacist refusals
may directly harm consumers.32 The FDA’s continued and controversial denial of drug manufacturers’ requests to make
emergency contraception available without a prescription33 ensures that women will continue to depend on pharmacists to
obtain those drugs quickly and easily.34
This Note demonstrates that pharmacies are required to
make only minimal accommodations for pharmacists who refuse to dispense certain drugs on religious grounds. Part I outlines the statutory requirements of religious accommodation
under Title VII, and then describes the landmark Supreme
Court cases interpreting those statutory requirements. Part II
argues that nearly any attempt to accommodate refusing
pharmacists would either be unreasonable or constitute an undue hardship on employers. Pharmacist refusals differ from
other employment contexts warranting religious accommodation because refusals frequently deny service to customers and
therefore cause employers to lose business. Congress did not
envision, and court precedents do not interpret, Title VII to ob-

ing Abortions in 2000–2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 294,
300 (2002).
30. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 235; Carol Ukens, Conscience vs. Patient
Rights: R.Ph.’s Refusal to Dispense Stirs Up Controversy, DRUG TOPICS, May
19, 1997, at 38.
31. See Task Force on Postovulatory Methods of Fertility Regulation,
World Health Org., Randomised Controlled Trial of Levonorgestrel Versus the
Yuzpe Regimen of Combined Oral Contraceptives for Emergency Contraception,
352 LANCET 428, 432 (1998) (discussing the inverse relationship between
pregnancy rates and the time from unprotected intercourse to treatment with
emergency contraceptives).
32. See Heather Boonstra, Emergency Contraception: Steps Being Taken to
Improve Access, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Dec. 2002, at 10, 10–11.
33. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-109, FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION: DECISION PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR
OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG
PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 19–30 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d06109.pdf.
34. See Herbe, supra note 14, at 81–82 (observing that FDA approval of
over-the-counter status for emergency contraception is “not likely in today’s
political climate”); see also James Trussel et al., Access to Emergency Contraception, 95 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 267, 269 (concluding that the need for
prompt treatment “presents a great challenge for women, who must find providers who will prescribe the pills and do so immediately”).
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ligate pharmacies to accommodate pharmacists who refuse to
perform essential job duties. This Note concludes that although
pharmacies are not required to make significant accommodations for refusing pharmacists, labor-market forces may compel
employers to make generous accommodations and then to use
Title VII as a pretense to justify those accommodations when
customers complain that they are denied access to prescription
drugs.
I. TITLE VII AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Absent legislation, the federal government has little influence over employment policies relating to religion. The First
Amendment constrains government employers,35 but it has a
negligible effect on the policies of private employers.36 As demonstrated below, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act restricts both
private and public employers’ right to terminate, discipline, or
refuse to hire employees on religious grounds.37
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196438
to combat discriminatory employment practices.39 The initial
legislation prohibited employment discrimination on the basis
of religion.40 Section 701(j) of the 1972 amendments to the Civil

35. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948)
(extending First Amendment prohibitions on laws inhibiting free exercise of
religion to acts of state governments). But see James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering Reasonable Accommodation, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 525 (2004) (arguing that Title VII is vulnerable to challenge on First Amendment and state sovereign immunity grounds).
36. See Josh Schopf, Religious Activity and Proselytization in the Workplace: The Murky Line Between Healthy Expression and Unlawful Harassment, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 52 n.93 (1997) (“Private employers do
not have the same First Amendment concerns as their government counterparts.”).
37. See also Ken Nakasu Davison, Comment, The Mixed-Race Experience:
Treatment of Racially Miscategorized Individuals Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN
L.J. 161, 165–66 (2005) (noting that Title VII regulates both public and private employers).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241,
253–66 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-15 (2000)).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355, 2401.
40. § 703(a), 78 Stat. at 255, (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . .
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Rights Act41 responded to judicial interpretation of the 1964
provision42 and incorporated guidelines developed by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).43 Section 701(j)
clarified that religion “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”44
The legislative history of section 701(j) is sparse.45 West
Virginia Senator Jennings Randolph, a Seventh-Day Baptist,46
proposed the measure, expressing the need “to assure that
freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of
workers is for all time guaranteed by law.”47 Senator
Randolph’s advocacy of the amendment on the Senate floor focused on the religious needs of individuals who “believe there
should be a steadfast observance of the Sabbath and require
that the observance of the day of worship, the day of the Sabbath, be other than on Sunday.”48 He included in the record reprints of two court decisions interpreting EEOC guidelines regarding employers’ obligations to accommodate the religious
beliefs and practices of employees.49 In fielding brief questions
from two senators about the extent of the burden imposed on
employers under the amendment, Senator Randolph agreed

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion . . . .”).
41. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 701(j), 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
42. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330–31 (1970), aff ’d
by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F.
Supp. 583, 584 (M.D. Fla. 1971); LEX K. LARSON, 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 56.01 (2d ed. 2005).
43. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967).
44. § 701(j), 86 Stat at 103.
45. See 118 CONG. REC. 705–31 (1972); see also Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“The brief legislative history of § 701(j) is
likewise of little assistance in [determining the degree of accommodation that
is required of an employer].”). Of the twenty-seven pages in the Congressional
Record devoted to the amendment, only the first two involve floor debate of the
proposal; the remainder consists of “the cases and regulations which are applicable to th[e] issue.” 118 CONG. REC. 706.
46. 118 CONG. REC. 705.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 706–13 (reprinting Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324
(6th Cir. 1970), and Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971)).
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that the provisions would not require an employer to “close
down” its operations in order to accommodate the needs of an
employee to observe a Sabbath, and noted that there would
perhaps be “a very, very small percentage of cases” in which an
employer and employee could not reach a voluntary arrangement.50
The Senate adopted the Randolph amendment with a 55–0
vote.51 The Supreme Court later noted that the language of the
amendment and the legislative record demonstrate that Congress intended to require employers to make some effort at accommodation, but the Court also observed that Congress failed
to provide guidance with respect to “how much an employer
must do to satisfy its statutory obligation.”52
B. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII
The Supreme Court has articulated two prongs of analysis
for an employer’s defense against allegations of religious discrimination.53 First, an employer may attempt to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee’s religious needs.54 At
this stage, the analysis hinges on whether the accommodation
is reasonable to the employee.55 If the employer offers an accommodation that is reasonable, it has fulfilled its obligations
under section 701(j), and no further examination is necessary.56
If, however, the employer asserts that it is unable to offer any
reasonable accommodation, the second prong of analysis requires an employer to demonstrate that any reasonable accommodation would present an undue hardship.57 If the employer can prove undue hardship for every reasonable
accommodation, it does not need to accommodate an employee.58 Two Supreme Court cases piece together this analysis.

50. Id. at 706.
51. Id. at 730–31. There is no record of abstentions; evidently many senators were absent at the time of the vote. See id.
52. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n.9 (1977);
see also Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d
772, 775 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“The ‘reach’ of the obligation has simply
never been spelled out by Congress or the EEOC.”).
53. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986).
54. See id. at 68, 70.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 68–69.
58. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977).
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The Supreme Court first interpreted section 701(j) in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.59 Trans World Airlines
(TWA) employee Larry Hardison worked at a site that was
open twenty-four hours a day, and a collective-bargaining
agreement governed his employment.60 Pursuant to that
agreement, Hardison’s union implemented a seniority system
for assigning shifts.61 During his employment with TWA, Hardison converted to a religious sect prohibiting work from sunset
on Friday to sunset on Saturday and informed his manager of
his beliefs.62 Hardison lacked seniority to bid successfully for a
shift that would correspond with his religious needs.63 Rejecting the first prong of analysis, TWA argued that it was unable
to provide any reasonable accommodation; all of the accommodations that Hardison proposed constituted an undue hardship.64 The union refused to violate seniority provisions and
TWA rejected Hardison’s proposal that he work only four days
a week.65 The Court outlined the burdens imposed by Hardison’s three proposed accommodations:
Hardison’s job was essential and on weekends he was the only available person on his shift to perform it. To leave the position empty
would have impaired supply shop functions, which were critical to airline operations; to fill Hardison’s position with a supervisor or an employee from another area would simply have undermanned another
operation; and to employ someone not regularly assigned to work
Saturdays would have required TWA to pay premium wages.66

TWA ultimately discharged Hardison on grounds of insubordination for refusing to work his Saturday shifts, and Hardison responded by filing suit against TWA and the union, alleging that his discharge violated Title VII.67
59. See id. at 74. The events at issue occurred prior to enactment of the
1972 amendments, but the Court acknowledged that the EEOC regulations
that were then in place included the same requirement for “reasonable accommodations” unless they would cause “undue hardship” for an employer. Id.
at 66. The Court granted deference to the EEOC regulations because Congress
had ratified the EEOC religious accommodation provisions in the 1972
amendments. See id. at 76 n.11.
60. See id. at 66–67.
61. See id. at 67.
62. See id. at 67–68.
63. See id. at 68.
64. See id. at 68–69; Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67
(1986) (“The employer in Hardison simply argued that all conceivable accommodations would result in undue hardship . . . .”).
65. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 68–69.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 69.
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The Supreme Court focused on the second prong of the section 701(j) analysis.68 It examined the three proposed accommodations (leaving the position empty, having a supervisor or
coworker from another area fill in, and hiring an additional
person to work Saturdays) and determined that each would
have been an undue hardship.69 The Court noted that because
the employer needed some employees to be on duty on weekends, there were two alternatives to determine who would be
required to work weekend shifts:
[A]dopt a neutral system, such as seniority, . . . or allocate days off in
accordance with the religious needs of [TWA’s] employees . . . . There
were no volunteers to relieve Hardison on Saturdays, and to give
Hardison Saturdays off, TWA would have had to deprive another employee of his shift preference at least in part because he did not adhere to a religion that observed the Saturday Sabbath.
Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment . . . . It
would be anomalous to conclude that by “reasonable accommodation”
Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees . . . in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not require an employer to go that far.70

The Court determined that the proposed accommodations
“would involve costs to TWA, either in the form of lost efficiency
in other jobs or higher wages” and held that because those accommodations would “require TWA to bear more than a de
minimis cost,” they would constitute an undue hardship.71
In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook,72 the Supreme
Court examined an employer’s obligations under section 701(j)
to accommodate a high school teacher who sought leave for religious observances.73 The Court focused primarily on the first
prong of analysis: the reasonableness of the proposed accommodations.74 The teacher proposed two accommodations,75 and
the employer offered an accommodation of its own.76 The Court
68. See id. at 78–81 (noting that TWA was not required to violate its collective-bargaining agreement to effect a shift swap and that the other accommodations would impose an undue hardship on the employer).
69. See id. at 81–85.
70. Id. at 80–81.
71. See id. at 84–85.
72. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
73. See id. at 63.
74. See id. at 67–71.
75. See id. at 64–65.
76. See id. at 70 (“We think that the school board policy in this case, requiring respondent to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that exceeded
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held that the employer was not obligated to accept the employee’s proposed accommodations because “[b]y its very terms
the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the
employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation.”77
Therefore, as long as an employer proposes at least one reasonable accommodation, it fulfills its obligations under section
701(j).78 Courts must consider the extent of the hardship only if
an employer “claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable
accommodation without [undue] hardship,”79 as in Hardison.
The Court then examined the employer’s accommodation to
determine whether it was reasonable.80 It found that the school
board policy requiring the teacher to take unpaid leave for religious observances was likely reasonable.81 But the Court
warned that such an accommodation would be unreasonable if
“paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones,”
arguing that this arrangement would constitute discrimination
against religious practices.82
The Supreme Court has therefore articulated two prongs of
analysis for an employer’s defense against charges of religious
discrimination under section 701(j). Hardison examines situations in which any accommodation would present an undue
hardship, emphasizing the second prong of the analysis and
holding that anything more than a “de minimis cost” would
constitute an undue hardship.83 Ansonia sketches out the remainder of the analysis. First, it articulates the relationship
between section 701(j)’s reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship clauses, noting that if an employer offers one reasonable accommodation, courts need not examine the hardship of
alternative accommodations.84 Additionally, it clarifies the first
prong’s standard for reasonableness, suggesting that an accommodation may be reasonable even if it requires an employee
to incur financial costs, but not if it allows more flexibility for

the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement, would generally
be a reasonable one.”).
77. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
78. See id. at 68–69.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 70–71.
81. See id. at 70.
82. See id. at 71 (remanding for a factual determination of the reasonableness of the accommodation).
83. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977).
84. See Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68–69.
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nonreligious accommodations than for religious accommodations.85 Both cases implicitly support the conclusion that the
reasonable accommodation analysis properly focuses on the
employee, rather than on the employer; the undue hardship
prong examines considerations of fairness to the employer.86
The following analysis will consider these two prongs in sequence.
II. PHARMACIST REFUSALS UNDER TITLE VII
Demonstrating a violation of Title VII’s religious accommodation provision is a two-step process.87 First, the employee
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.88 To do
this, the employee must demonstrate a sincerely held religious
belief which interferes with an employment requirement, and
then must show that the employer discharged or disciplined the
employee89 for failure to comply with the requirement.90 This
Note presumes that a refusing pharmacist who is terminated or
disciplined is able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and focuses on the two-prong analysis articulated in Hardison and Ansonia to determine whether Title VII is violated.
Once the employee establishes a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the employer must demonstrate that it
has met its burdens under Title VII by making a good faith effort to provide a reasonable accommodation, or by demonstrat-

85. See id. at 70–71.
86. See Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and
Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 606–09 (2000) (concluding that an employee
may be required to bear certain costs as part of a reasonable accommodation);
id. at 610–22 (surveying employer burdens that have been found to constitute
undue hardships).
87. See Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781
F.2d 772, 775–76 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
88. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (setting forth the elements of a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII).
89. Threat of discharge or discipline is generally sufficient to meet this
requirement. See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5
(9th Cir. 1988); Young v. Sw. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir.
1975).
90. See, e.g., Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir.
1987); Am. Postal Workers Union, 781 F.2d at 775; Turpen v. Mo.–Kan.–Tex.
R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574
F.2d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 1978). The employee must inform the employer of the
need for religious accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (2000).
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ing that any reasonable accommodation would result in undue
hardship.91 Careful application of section 701(j) must distinguish between the reasonable accommodation analysis and examination of undue hardship.92 Part A of this section explores
possible employer accommodations for pharmacists who refuse
to dispense certain drugs on religious grounds and discusses
whether they would be considered reasonable from the employee’s perspective. Part B examines the accommodations that
would likely be considered reasonable and determines that they
would usually impose more than de minimis costs on the employer. Part C addresses the unresolved question of whether an
employer must always make a good faith effort to accommodate
under section 701(j).
A. POTENTIAL REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
Commentators have divided religious accommodation jurisprudence into several categories.93 “Work schedule” cases
comprise by far the largest category.94 Illustrative examples in
this category include Hardison and Ansonia, where employees
requested not to work on their Sabbath or on particular holy
days. A second category relates to the payment of union dues,95
and a third category addresses rules governing employee appearance.96 Relatively few employees raise section 701(j) challenges when they face negative consequences for refusing to
perform particular job duties on religious grounds.97 Pharma-

91. See, e.g., Am. Postal Workers Union, 781 F.2d at 775–76; Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 1986).
92. See Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“Reasonableness and the avoidance of undue hardship are distinct.”).
93. See, e.g., VERN E. HAUCK, ARBITRATING RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION GRIEVANCES 119–46 (1997); Douglas Massengill & Donald J. Petersen, Job Requirements and Religious Practices: Conflict
and Accommodation, 39 LAB. L.J. 402, 407–09 (1988).
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1) (2000); HAUCK, supra note 93, at 119–28;
LARSON, supra note 42, § 56.06; Debbie N. Kaminer, When Business and Employees’ Religion Clash, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 2000, at 1.
95. See § 1605.2(d)(2); HAUCK, supra note 93, at 146; LARSON, supra note
42, § 56.07; KENNETH L. SOVEREIGN, PERSONNEL LAW 75–76 (4th ed. 1999).
96. See HAUCK, supra note 93, at 138–40; LARSON, supra note 42, § 56.10.
97. See Tramm v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., No. H 87-355, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16391, at *11 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1989) (mag. j. order) (“Past cases involving religious discrimination in the context of Title VII usually have addressed the issue of accommodating persons whose religious beliefs prevented
them from working on their Sabbath or from supporting unions.”); Massengill
& Petersen, supra note 93, at 408 (stating that work duty conflicts have “sur-
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cists refusing to fill prescriptions on religious grounds fall into
this last category. Examining accommodations for such employees, the Fifth Circuit observed that, “[a]ccommodation can
take place in two fundamental ways: (1) an employee can be accommodated in his or her current position by changing the
working conditions, or (2) the employer can offer to let the employee transfer to another reasonably comparable position
where conflicts are less likely to arise.”98 When an employee refuses to perform a job duty on religious grounds, courts frequently consider the accommodations of transferring either the
employee or the job duty.99
Even though section 701(j) does not explicitly say what degree of accommodation is required, the legislative history suggests that Congress did not consider the possibility of employees refusing categorically to perform certain essential job
duties.100 Courts typically require accommodations for employees seeking to observe their Sabbath,101 but similar generosity
for employees refusing to perform job duties may violate the
spirit and intent of the statute.
Regulations for the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
provide a useful analogy102 for determining what constitutes a
reasonable accommodation when an employee cannot perform
certain job duties.103 Applying the EEOC regulations related to
the ADA to the question of whether filling birth control prescriptions is an essential function of a pharmacist requires an-

faced on occasion”).
98. Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2001);
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(iii) (2004) (“When an employee cannot be accommodated either as to his or her entire job or an assignment within the job,
employers . . . should consider whether or not it is possible to change the job
assignment or give the employee a lateral transfer.”).
99. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (d)(1)(iii).
100. See 118 CONG. REC. 705–31 (1972).
101. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1470 (9th Cir.
1996).
102. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that discrimination on the basis of religion is “the closest analogy to discrimination on
the basis of handicap”).
103. See Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir.
2001) (recognizing that if an employee is unable to perform essential job functions even after reasonable accommodation, the employer has no duty to accommodate); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2004) (requiring modifications that enable
an employee “to perform the essential functions” of a position). “Essential
functions” include “the fundamental job duties” of the position and exclude
those functions which are “marginal.” See § 1630.2(n)(1).
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swering three questions. First, does the employer actually require pharmacists to fill birth control prescriptions? Second,
would removing the function fundamentally alter the position?
Third, is the position of pharmacist a highly skilled profession
in which the individual is hired for his expertise or his ability
to fill birth control prescriptions?104 An employer can readily
answer the first and third questions in the affirmative. To assist an employer in answering the second question, the EEOC
suggests two factors that an employer may consider. First, is
the reason the position exists to perform that function? Second,
are there few employees available to perform that function?105
Employers hire pharmacists to fill a variety of prescriptions,
and they typically expect each pharmacist to be able to fill all
requested prescriptions.106 Moreover, a pharmacist may only be
replaced by similarly licensed personnel to perform the job duty
of dispensing prescriptions.107 Therefore, filling birth control
prescriptions is an essential function for pharmacists. Thus,
even under the stricter reasonable accommodations of the ADA,
an employer would not need to accommodate a pharmacist who
is unable (or unwilling) to fill birth control prescriptions.108 Because accommodation of refusing pharmacists would require
many employers to excuse employees from performing essential

104. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).
105. See id.
106. See MICKEY C. SMITH & DAVID A. KNAPP, PHARMACY, DRUGS AND
MEDICAL CARE 146–47 (5th ed. 1992) (observing that the occupation of pharmacist is generally not specialized, with limited exceptions not applicable to
the retail context); see, e.g., Pharmacist.com, Employment Center Job Detail:
Staff
Pharmacist/Graduate
Intern
http://aphanet.jobcontrolcenter.com/
jobdetail.cfm?job=2276467 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) (stating that “major responsibilities” for Supervalu pharmacists include supervising the dispensing
of all prescriptions).
107. See RICHARD R. ABOOD & DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE
AND THE LAW 190 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that federal law prohibits a person
from dispensing certain drugs if the person is not authorized to do so under
state law); Harry P. Hagel, Staffing Modifications for Pharmaceutical Care, in
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PHARMACEUTICAL CARE 253, 254–55 (John P. Rovers
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) (noting that pharmacists are exclusively responsible
for conducting the final check of prescriptions, counseling patients, and conducting a warning assessment); see also Carol Ukens, Medco Faces Federal
Fraud Charges, DRUG TOPICS, Oct. 20, 2003, at 14 (reporting that a pharmacy
faced federal fraud charges for using non-pharmacist personnel to dispense
prescriptions without review by a pharmacist).
108. See SOVEREIGN, supra note 95, at 69 (noting that under the ADA, undue hardship must be greater than de minimis to excuse an employer from accommodating an employee with a disability).
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job duties, the EEOC interpretation of the ADA suggests that
no accommodation may be necessary.
The facts and circumstances of each particular employment
relationship guide courts in ascertaining the reasonableness of
any accommodation.109 An employer might make one of several
accommodations for objecting pharmacists.
1. Permit Prescription Transfer to Another Pharmacist
Employers are likely to accommodate pharmacists by allowing another pharmacist to fill the objectionable prescription.110 In American Postal Workers Union, San Francisco Local
v. Postmaster General,111 the Ninth Circuit considered the obligations of the U.S. Postal Service to accommodate window
clerks who objected on religious grounds to processing selective
service registration forms.112 The first accommodation allowed
employees to refer registrants to other window clerks who were
willing to process the forms.113 Likewise, an employment policy
allowing a pharmacist to hand off the objectionable prescription
to another pharmacist is likely a reasonable accommodation.
This accommodation may require shift swapping to ensure that
a second pharmacist is on duty to handle the objectionable prescription.114 Similar accommodations may be implemented by
creating separate lines for objectionable and nonobjectionable
prescriptions, or posting hours when objectionable prescriptions
will not be filled. In the alternative, an objecting pharmacist
might be required to transfer the prescription to a different
pharmacy.115

109. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 902–03 (7th Cir. 1978).
110. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 239–40 (surveying the refusal policies of
major pharmacy chains and noting that both Walgreens and CVS have policies
requiring pharmacists to refer prescriptions to another pharmacist on duty or
to another pharmacy).
111. 781 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
112. See id.
113. See id. The U.S. Postal Service later revised its accommodation policy
and withdrew this accommodation. See id.
114. Cf. Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982)
(considering a similar accommodation within a team of three employment
counselors).
115. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 239–40 (noting that Walgreens and CVS
pharmacies allow the refusing pharmacist to refer the prescription to another
pharmacy).
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Employees are required to cooperate and to be flexible in
achieving their requested accommodation,116 but sometimes an
employee refuses on religious grounds to participate in a proposed accommodation. For example, in EEOC v. J.P. Stevens &
Co.,117 employees argued that the employer’s accommodation
requiring them to recruit coworkers to swap Sabbath shifts itself violated their religious beliefs.118 The court determined that
the accommodation was unreasonable, particularly because the
employer could have easily taken measures to recruit
coworkers to swap shifts.119 As Neil Noesen’s manager learned
on July 6, 2002, some pharmacists object on religious grounds
to playing any role in the transfer of an objectionable prescription.120 For such individuals, courts may find that only employer-initiated accommodations creating separate lines or
posting schedules are reasonable, and that requiring a pharmacist to transfer an objectionable prescription to another pharmacist, whether at the same work site or at another pharmacy,
is an unreasonable accommodation, and therefore is not required under Title VII.121
2. Facilitate Transfer to a Different Position at the Same
Work Location
American Postal Workers Union evaluated a second accommodation offered by the Postal Service. The Postal Service
revised its regulations to require all window clerks to process
selective service registration forms; the regulations directed
those clerks with religious objections to transfer to other positions.122 The Ninth Circuit determined that the Postal Service’s
116. See Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 503 (5th Cir.
2001) (“An employee has a duty to cooperate in achieving accommodation of
his or her religious beliefs, and must be flexible in achieving that end.”).
117. 740 F. Supp. 1135 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (mem.).
118. See id. at 1136.
119. Id. at 1139; accord Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1088 (6th
Cir. 1987).
120. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080,
paras. 26, 34 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi
.gov/dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm; Herbe, supra note 14, at 89 (“For many
pharmacists, a referral would be no more than passive participation in the activity they initially refused to actively assist.”).
121. Cf. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d at 1088–89 (concluding that requiring
an employee to violate his religious beliefs by recruiting his own Sabbath replacements was not a reasonable accommodation, and that requiring the employer to recruit replacements did not constitute an undue hardship).
122. See Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781
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proposed accommodation of allowing job transfer was potentially reasonable.123 The court noted that the workers’ objections to the accommodation were grounded in the belief that
“the accommodation would place them in a less attractive employment status.”124 Acknowledging this objection, the court
held that “[w]here an employer proposes an accommodation
which effectively eliminates the religious conflict faced by a
particular employee . . . the inquiry under Title VII reduces to
whether the accommodation reasonably preserves the affected
employee’s employment status.”125 Therefore, courts are to determine whether transfer to a less attractive position is reasonable under the circumstances.126
At least one other court has explored the reasonableness of
job transfer as an accommodation. In Bruff v. North Mississippi
Health Services, Inc.,127 the Fifth Circuit entertained a Title VII
claim brought by a counselor who refused on religious grounds
to provide certain counseling assistance.128 Sandra Bruff
worked for a medical center as one of three employee assistance
counselors providing counseling to employees of several regional businesses.129 Typically, only one counselor would travel
to a work site to conduct sessions.130 Bruff’ s employer suggested that she request a transfer to another position or department in which such conflicts would be minimized.131 Bruff
chose not to apply for another available counselor position and
was eventually terminated.132 The court held that the employer’s offer of employment counseling to identify another position at the center and the thirty-day extension to find another
position constituted a reasonable accommodation.133 The court

F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
123. See id. at 776–77.
124. Id. at 776.
125. Id. at 776–77.
126. See id.
127. 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001).
128. See id. at 497. Bruff specifically requested to “be excused from . . . actively helping people involved in the homosexual lifestyle to have a better relationship with their homosexual partners. This would also include helping persons who have a sexual relationship outside of marriage have a better sexual
relationship.” Id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 498.
132. See id. at 498–99.
133. See id. at 501.

BERGQUIST_3FMT

2006]

04/24/2006 10:38:27 AM

PHARMACIST REFUSALS

1091

found that a transfer to a noncounseling position resulting in
more than a fifty-percent reduction in pay would not necessarily constitute an unreasonable accommodation.134
Based on these cases, courts may find that requiring a
pharmacist to transfer to another position that would not require the pharmacist to dispense objectionable medications is a
reasonable accommodation. However, a retail establishment
with a pharmacy is unlikely to have comparable positions for
which a pharmacist is qualified.135 According to one report,
“[p]harmacists are among the most highly compensated employees in a retail environment,”136 and the average annual
pharmacist salary in a chain drugstore is over $92,000.137 In
light of Bruff, an employer might encourage an objecting pharmacist to apply for available managerial positions, even if the
pharmacist would face a substantial pay cut.138 All positions
the employer encouraged Bruff to pursue made use of her counseling and social work background.139 A similar job transfer accommodation for pharmacists would probably not make use of
the employee’s technical training, and therefore might not “reasonably preserve[] the affected employee’s employment status,”
as required by American Postal Workers Union.140
3. Facilitate Transfer to a Different Work Location
Transfer to a similar job assignment at a different work
site may also be a reasonable accommodation.141 The Seventh

134. See id. at 498 n.5 (noting that the available noncounseling positions
paid between $7 and $8 per hour, while Bruff was earning over $16 per hour
in her counseling position); id. at 502 n.23 (“As previously noted, these noncounselor positions would have required Bruff to take a significant reduction
in salary. This alone, however, does not make the accommodation unreasonable.”).
135. See SMITH & KNAPP, supra note 106, at 138 (noting that there are limited opportunities for nonadministrative professional advancement in chain
pharmacies).
136. Mike Troy, Wal-Mart Rewrites Prescription for Competition, DSN RETAILING TODAY, Aug. 16, 2004, at 4, 42.
137. See Julie Schmit, Help Wanted at Your Drugstore: Pharmacist Shortage Makes Grads Highly Sought After, USA TODAY, Aug. 17, 2005, at 3B.
138. Cf. Bruff, 244 F.3d at 502 n.23.
139. See id at 502–03.
140. Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d
772, 776–77 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
141. Cf. 4 Pharmacists Sue over Contraceptive Dispute, WASH. POST, Jan.
29, 2006, at A15 (quoting a Walgreens spokesperson who confirmed that several refusing pharmacists in Illinois were offered the opportunity to transfer to
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Circuit in Rodriguez v. City of Chicago142 examined a police officer’s religious objection to protecting abortion clinics.143 The
court determined that the police department’s offer to transfer
the officer to a district with no abortion clinic constituted a reasonable accommodation.144
Drawing on Rodriguez, an employer might offer an objecting pharmacist the opportunity to transfer to another facility
that does not dispense objectionable medications.145 Some employers may provide pharmacy services at nursing homes or
other extended-care facilities where objectionable medications
are not dispensed; in those situations, a transfer may be a reasonable accommodation. However, independent and chain
pharmacies are unlikely to have such facilities. In other situations, a national chain could assist an objecting pharmacist in a
rural pharmacy with few shift options to transfer to a different
site with more pharmacists on staff. In these cases, however, a
lengthy commute or employee relocation may be unreasonable,146 and an employer does not need to give preference to objecting pharmacists when hiring for what might be more desirable positions in more populated areas.147
jobs in states with less stringent pharmacy regulations).
142. 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).
143. Id. at 773–74.
144. Id. at 775. Chief Judge Richard A. Posner, concurring with the judgment of the court, advocated a broader ruling that persons employed in governmental protective services “have no right under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to recuse themselves from having to protect persons of whose activities they disapprove for religious (or any other) reasons.” Id. at 779 (Posner, C.J., concurring). Posner’s views were later incorporated into the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in Endres v. Indiana State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 926–27 (7th
Cir. 2003).
145. See Marilyn Gardner, Pharmacists’ Moral Beliefs vs. Women’s Legal
Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2004, at 11 (noting that some
pharmacists objecting to contraceptives have found jobs in nursing homes);
Shortage of Pharmacists, supra note 15, at 246 (reporting “the growing role of
pharmacists in medication therapy management, immunizations and other
patient care services”).
146. See Ukens, supra note 30, at 40 (“Be ready to move all over the country to find a job . . . .” (quoting a pharmacist who was terminated for refusing
to dispense birth control)).
147. Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977)
(holding that Title VII does not require employers to deny the job and shift
preferences of some employees in order to accommodate the religious needs of
others); Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 502 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that Title VII does not obligate employers to give an employee seeking religious accommodation preference over other employees applying for the
same transfer position).
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In summary, employers have three primary means to accommodate objecting pharmacists: facilitate the transfer of the
prescription, facilitate the transfer of the pharmacist to different job duties, or facilitate the transfer of the pharmacist to a
different site that will not require the pharmacist to engage in
objectionable activities. Ansonia requires the pharmacy either
to offer at least one of these reasonable accommodations or to
demonstrate that every reasonable accommodation imposes an
undue hardship.148
B. THE DE MINIMIS COST RESTRICTION
An employer may object to any of the three reasonable accommodations examined above by arguing that the accommodation constitutes an undue hardship, imposing more than a de
minimis cost on its business.149 The following sections consider
each accommodation under Hardison’s de minimis cost standard.
1. Permit Prescription Transfer to Another Pharmacist
Permitting the pharmacist to transfer the prescription to
another pharmacist may impose significant costs on a pharmacy. For some employers, another pharmacist might normally
always be on duty, and the accommodation could be fairly
smooth.150 Yet even under these seemingly ideal conditions, a
court may find an undue hardship. An arbitrator considered
the complaint of a grocery store cashier who refused to sell lottery tickets on religious grounds in the case of In re Lucky
Stores, Inc.151 The arbitrator determined that the sale of lottery
tickets was “a reasonable and appropriate task” for the position
of cashier, and found that “it was not operationally feasible” for
the store to establish one check-out register as a “no lottery

148. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986).
149. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977).
150. See Gardner, supra note 145 (“‘In the great majority of cases, the
pharmacist’s right to conscience is exercised appropriately and seamlessly . . .’
[American Pharmacists Association spokesperson Michael] Stewart says. ‘A
pharmacist can say, “Let me get Bob for you, ma’am,” and that’s the end of
that.’”).
151. 88 L.A. 841, 841–42 (1987). Courts “may properly afford . . . great
weight” to an arbitral decision that thoroughly considers the factual issues
surrounding an employee’s Title VII rights. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974).
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ticket stand.”152 The arbitrator noted that this accommodation
“would cause scheduling problems as well as the operational,
customer flow problems” and concluded that these challenges
imposed a “more than de minimis” burden on the employer.153
Because pharmacists working on the same shift typically
work in the same area and serve the same queue of customers,
accommodation involving handing a prescription over to another on-duty pharmacist is likely to impose only a de minimis
cost on an employer.154 When a pharmacist objects to transferring a prescription to another pharmacist on duty, however,
Lucky Stores suggests that section 701(j) does not require a
pharmacy either to implement a separate queuing system for
nonobjectionable prescriptions or to require customers to seek
out the nonobjecting pharmacist.155
These same-pharmacy transfer accommodations may be
impractical for pharmacies that do not always have two pharmacists on duty.156 Many chain drug stores now offer twentyfour-hour pharmacy services, and only one pharmacist may be
on duty during evening and late-night hours and on the weekends (as was the case at the K-Mart where Neil Noesen
worked).157 Under those circumstances, an employer could implement four different accommodations. First, an employer
could ensure that an objecting pharmacist never works a solo
shift, so that a nonobjecting pharmacist would always be available to fill an objectionable prescription.158 Second, an employer

152. Lucky Stores, 88 L.A. at 844, 846.
153. Id. at 846.
154. Cf. Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781
F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (noting a similar accommodation
allowing objecting postal clerks to refer selective service registrants to other
window clerks).
155. See Lucky Stores, 88 L.A. at 846.
156. See Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982)
(describing an employer’s shift system with a solo pharmacist on duty for 56 of
the 101 hours of every week that the pharmacy was open).
157. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080,
para. 21 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi.gov/
dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm; cf. Brener, 671 F.2d at 143 (observing that
the hospital pharmacy was staffed by a solo pharmacist on weekends).
158. Cf. Press Release, Am. Life League, Canada Safeway—Preparing to
Sell Euthanasia Drugs? (Apr. 4, 2000) 2006 LEXIS iINTERNATIONAL NEWS
(noting that the policy of Canada Safeway is that if an objecting pharmacist
cannot comply with the duty to fill all prescriptions, “the pharmacist will not
be scheduled to work in any store during any period of time when he or she
would be the sole pharmacist on duty”).
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could ensure that another pharmacist is always on call to fill an
objectionable prescription. Third, an employer could require an
objecting pharmacist to transfer the prescription to a different
pharmacy. Fourth, an employer could post a sign listing the
days and hours when objectionable prescriptions will not be
filled. As demonstrated below, each of these accommodations
imposes a more than de minimis cost on the employer, and
therefore is not required under section 701(j).
An employer may attempt to accommodate the objecting
pharmacist by structuring shift assignments so that an objecting pharmacist will never be the only pharmacist on duty.
Many pharmacies, however, may not be able to provide this accommodation because they never have more than one pharmacist on duty.159 In larger pharmacies with some solo shifts and
some shifts staffed by more than one pharmacist, the solo shifts
are more likely to involve undesirable hours, such as evenings
and weekends.160 Other pharmacists might volunteer for these
solo shifts, but Hardison expressly held that an employer is not
required to force other employees to take undesirable shifts in
order to accommodate a religious objector.161
This accommodation is similar to voluntary shift swapping
that some employers have used to accommodate Saturday Sabbath observers.162 An employer may be required to attempt
such voluntary shift swapping,163 but courts sometimes reject
these accommodations for imposing an undue hardship on employers.164 Moreover, one circuit determined that an employer’s
obligation to facilitate shift swapping would constitute an undue hardship if it involved more than ninety minutes of effort.165

159. See, e.g., Katie Fairbank, Waging a Moral Battle from Behind the
Counter: Pharmacists’ Refusal to Fill Contraception Prescriptions Prompts the
Question: Whose Choice Is It to Make?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 24, 2005,
at 1A (reporting that many Texas pharmacies have only one pharmacist).
160. See, e.g., Brener, 671 F.2d at 143. Under the work schedule described
in Brener, an objecting pharmacist would have to work either the 8 a.m. to 4
p.m. or the 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. weekday shift in order to avoid working any solo
hours. See id. The pharmacist would not be able to work the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. or
the 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. weekday shifts, or either of the weekend shifts. See id.
161. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977).
162. See, e.g., id.
163. See EEOC v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 740 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (M.D.N.C.
1990) (mem.).
164. See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.
165. See Turpen v. Mo.–Kan.–Tex. R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1025, 1028 (5th
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Pharmacists seeking shift swaps impose an even greater
hardship on employers than Saturday Sabbatarians seeking
shift swaps; the former are likely never to be able to work an
undesirable shift, while the latter are willing to work all but
one or two undesirable shifts. Therefore, a Saturday Sabbath
observer is able to swap shifts with someone working late
nights or Sundays, and such swaps may be easily facilitated.166
An objecting pharmacist, on the other hand, would be asking
coworkers to take evening, late night, and weekend shifts and
give up regular weekday shifts. Coworker complaints about
shift changes or the absence of volunteers could constitute evidence that this accommodation imposes a more than de minimis cost on the business by creating work schedules that are
impossible to fill without hiring additional pharmacists or undermining employee morale.167
The second option is to ensure that another pharmacist is
always on call. K-Mart attempted to provide this accommodation for Neil Noesen.168 When Amanda Renz contacted the store
manager, the manager called Noesen’s supervisor, who was the
head pharmacist.169 Even if a supervisor is available, or another pharmacist is on call, this accommodation could constitute an undue hardship on an employer under the terms of
Hardison because it might require an employer to pay premium
wages to the fill-in pharmacist, or it could detract from a supervisor’s other work duties.170 Furthermore, in light of the
critical shortage of pharmacists,171 many employers may be unable to ensure that a back-up pharmacist is on call.172
Cir. 1984).
166. See Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1470 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that as long as the Saturday Sabbatarian worked an “equal number
of undesirable shifts,” there would be no undue hardship on other employees).
167. See Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146–47 (5th Cir.
1982) (concluding that complaints of coworkers and disrupted work routines
resulting from shift swapping could constitute an undue hardship); cf. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81 (concluding that the employer did not need to compel other
employees to work Hardison’s shifts after no coworkers volunteered to swap).
168. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080,
para. 16 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi.gov/dept/
decisions/docs/0405070.htm.
169. See id. para. 36.
170. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 68–69.
171. See Shortage of Pharmacists, supra note 15, at 246. As argued below,
this shortage may also encourage employers to accommodate objecting pharmacists beyond the requirements of Title VII.
172. See Schmit, supra note 137 (noting that in rural areas it may take two
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The third option is to require an objecting pharmacist to
transfer the prescription to a different pharmacy. As noted
above, some pharmacists will object on religious grounds to
their own participation in this accommodation, and therefore
the accommodation is unreasonable for them.173 For pharmacists who do not object to transferring a prescription, this accommodation imposes greater than de minimis costs by sacrificing customer business.174 If the objectionable prescription is for
oral contraceptives, the pharmacy is likely to lose the profits
from an entire year of dispensing that medication to the customer.175 Moreover, because most consumers prefer to fill all of
their regular prescriptions in the same pharmacy, the employer
will likely forego all of that customer’s business.176 Additionally, transfers may alienate customers who find the process
humiliating and discriminatory.177 In some cases, store policies
allowing pharmacists to transfer prescriptions to other pharmacies have generated negative publicity and even protests,178
and in some jurisdictions pharmacies can be sanctioned for failing to fill customer prescriptions.179 All of these business costs

to three hours to fill an emergency vacancy).
173. See EEOC v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 740 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (M.D.N.C.
1990) (mem.).
174. Cf., e.g., Fairbank, supra note 159 (reporting that a pharmacy in a
Texas small town “had been filling about five or six prescriptions [for oral contraceptives] a day” and that ceasing to fill those prescriptions “had a financial
consequence”).
175. See Kara Platoni, Free the Pill!, E. BAY EXPRESS (, June 22, 2005, at
14, 14, available at http://www.eastbayexpress.com/issues/2005-06-22/news/
feature.html (observing that prescriptions for oral contraception typically provide a one-year supply).
176. Cf., e.g., Fairbank, supra note 159 (“It made a huge difference because
they would get their other prescriptions somewhere else too. I assumed that
would happen, and it did.” (quoting a pharmacy owner who decided to stop
carrying oral contraceptives)).
177. See Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies: Hearing Before the
H. Small Bus. Comm., 109th Cong. 13–14 (2005) (statement of oral contraception consumer Megan Kelly). These customer concerns are equally relevant for
the separate-queue accommodation.
178. See Josephine Marcotty, Birth-Control Battle at Target, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Nov. 11, 2005, at D1 (describing Planned Parenthood protests
at Target headquarters to draw attention to the retailer’s policy of allowing
pharmacists to turn away customers requesting emergency contraceptives).
179. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 733, 4314–15 (West 2005); see
also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief paras. 28–30, Menges v.
Blagojevich, No. 3:05-cv-03307 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2005) (stating that after Illinois initiated disciplinary actions against several Walgreens stores for failure
to comply with the state law, the chain established a new employment policy
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constitute an undue hardship on an employer,180 and therefore
this accommodation is not required under Title VII.
A final option is to post a sign listing the days and hours
when objectionable prescriptions will not be filled. A pharmacist who objects to participating in the transfer of a prescription
may consider this accommodation reasonable,181 but the pharmacy still incurs most of the business costs involved with the
previous accommodation. Customers who approach the pharmacy with an objectionable prescription at a time when the objecting pharmacist is on duty will have an incentive to turn to a
competitor, if one is available.182 This accommodation provides
customers with additional information and options, and therefore it may not drive away as much business as a policy of outright transfer to other pharmacies. Some consumers, however,
will need or want their prescriptions filled before a
nonobjecting pharmacist is available. Moreover, this accommodation encumbers customers such as Amanda Renz, who already have their yearly prescriptions on file and would depend
on the pharmacist to participate in the transfer of the refill.183
requiring all pharmacists to dispense emergency contraception and subsequently suspended several pharmacists who refused to comply with the policy). For discussion of the Illinois rule, see Sarah Vokes, Note, “Just Fill the
Prescription”: Why Illinois’ Emergency Rule Appropriately Resolves the Tension
Between Religion and Contraception in the Pharmacy Context, 24 LAW & INEQ.
(forthcoming 2006). Other states have enacted legislation protecting pharmacists who refuse to dispense certain medications on religious grounds. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4) (2000); see also Rob Stein, Health Workers’
Choice Debated: Proposals Back Right Not to Treat, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2006, at A1 (reporting that several state legislatures are considering similar
legislation). Because Hardison’s de minimis standard for undue hardship arguably draws the boundary between constitutional government protections
against religion-based discrimination and unconstitutional government establishment of religion, see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
89 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting), these state laws may be unconstitutional
if they are found to impose a greater than de minimis burden on employers.
180. Cf. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84–85 (1977) (noting that accommodations
imposing financial costs on the employer in the form of reduced efficiency or
payment of higher wages for replacement workers constituted an undue hardship); Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner,
C.J., concurring) (“It is undue hardship in spades when the necessary accommodation would strike a body blow to the employer’s business.”).
181. See Herbe, supra note 14, at 101.
182. But see Teliska, supra note 1, at 244 (arguing that pharmacist refusals
impose a heavy burden on rural and low-income women, who may lack convenient access to back-up pharmacies).
183. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080,
paras. 21–22 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi.gov/
dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm.

BERGQUIST_3FMT

2006]

04/24/2006 10:38:27 AM

PHARMACIST REFUSALS

1099

The D.C. District Court examined a similar accommodation
in which objectionable work duties were set aside until other
employees were available. In Haring v. Blumenthal,184 Paul
Haring alleged that the IRS discriminated against him with respect to promotions because he objected on religious grounds to
processing certain tax-exemption applications.185 The IRS accommodated Haring by not assigning him to process such applications,186 but determined that promoting Haring to a reviewer position would create operational difficulties.187 The
court found that the IRS had failed to demonstrate an undue
hardship, noting that Haring objected to a very small percentage of applications that the division processed, and observing
that delays incurred as a result of the accommodation would be
inconsequential because processing delays were normal within
the division.188
Pharmacist refusals differ from Harding’s refusal to process IRS forms in several ways. First, objectionable prescriptions
may not be a very small percentage of the prescriptions processed by a pharmacy,189 and therefore asking customers to return when another pharmacist is available may disrupt work
flow. Second, while delays in processing IRS forms may be typical and inconsequential, pharmacy customers generally expect
their prescriptions to be filled quickly.190 Third, the IRS does
not need to compete with other service providers in processing
tax-exempt applications; pharmacies are participants in a competitive marketplace which places a premium on efficiency and
customer service.191 Fourth, the financial success of the IRS is
184. 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979).
185. He objected to tax exemptions for organizations involved with or promoting a variety of activities which he determined violated “God’s Natural
Law,” including abortions, homosexuality, euthanasia, atheism, legalization of
marijuana, and artificial contraception. See id. at 1175 n.4, 1176.
186. Id. at 1180 n.21.
187. See id. at 1180.
188. See id.
189. See Terri Madden et al., 2000 in Review: Growth Slows, but Goes On,
MED. MKTG. & MEDIA, May 2001, at 74, 78 (reporting that oral contraceptives
constituted the seventh-largest class of therapeutic prescription drugs dispensed in 2000, accounting for over 79 million prescriptions nationwide).
190. See Assessing HIPAA: How Federal Medicaid Record Privacy Regulations Can Be Improved: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Energy & Commerce Comm., 107th Cong. 53 (2001) (statement of CVS director of
government relations Carlos R. Ortiz).
191. See Ritzman Counts on Service for Competitive Edge, CHAIN DRUG
REV. (N.Y.), Apr. 26, 2004, at 200.
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not contingent on processing tax-exempt status applications. A
pharmacy, on the other hand, may lose profits when an accommodation pushes customers to seek the services of a competitor.192
Courts have yet to resolve the question of whether the
scope of an employer’s obligation to accommodate under Title
VII may ever be limited by an employer’s extrapolation that accommodating one employee would potentially result in an undue hardship if other employees were to assert similar
rights.193 Some of the above accommodations might not pose an
undue hardship if only one pharmacist requested accommodation. In the case of shift swapping or schedule posting, accommodating a second or third pharmacist could constitute an undue hardship, where the first accommodation may not.194 If
only one employee requests accommodation, courts may look
unfavorably on an extrapolation argument; an employer will
have stronger grounds for termination if it can demonstrate
that accommodating even the first pharmacist would result in
more than de minimis costs.195

192. See, e.g., Ruderman, supra note 17 (recalling that when a neighborhood pharmacy refused to fill her father’s morphine prescription, she sought
out a larger competitor and “for years afterward” returned there “to buy items
[she] could have bought more conveniently elsewhere”); Sanchez, supra note
11 (reporting that after a pharmacist told Adriane Gilbert on the telephone
that he could not help her because he opposed birth control, she “decided to
find another drugstore” even though the pharmacy called back minutes later
to apologize).
193. See Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1181 (D.D.C. 1979).
Compare Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1979) (arguing that “undue hardship” excludes the employer’s speculations regarding the
future behavior of the employee’s coworkers) and Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co.,
589 F.2d 403, 406–07 (9th Cir. 1978) (same) with Endres v. Ind. State Police,
349 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 2003) (arguing that allowing a police officer to refuse a work assignment would undermine discipline and prompt other public
service officers to refuse assignments on religious grounds). EEOC regulations
state: “A mere assumption that many more people . . . may also need accommodation is not evidence of undue hardship.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1)
(2004).
194. For example, an employer using the shift schedule used in Brener
could not accommodate more than one pharmacist out of five and still ensure
that all prescriptions would be filled. See Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671
F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982).
195. See Brown , 601 F.2d at 961 (holding that undue hardship is limited to
the hardship imposed by the specific accommodation at issue and may not include consideration of “anticipated or multiplied hardship” that may result if
other employees make similar requests for accommodation).
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2. Facilitate Transfer to a Different Position at the Same
Work Location
If an employer has a suitable open position, this accommodation is likely to create no more than de minimis costs for the
employer. Even in Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Services,
Inc., the court did not require the employer to create a new position for the objecting employee.196 Instead, the employer made
a reasonable accommodation by providing job counseling to assist the employee in applying for positions as they became
available within the company.197 As the Supreme Court held in
Hardison, an employee is not entitled to any preferential status
when the company considers applications for vacancies; interfering with standard hiring decisions would constitute an undue hardship.198 Therefore, if an objecting pharmacist would
find employment in a different position at the same location
reasonable, then the employer must assist the pharmacist in
applying for such a position when it becomes available.
3. Facilitate Transfer to a Different Work Location
This accommodation is probably not available to many retail pharmacies. Most pharmacy chains have unfilled pharmacist positions in many locations,199 but each pharmacist presumably is responsible for filling objectionable prescriptions. In
the rare instance when an employer has certain work sites
where a pharmacist would not need to process objectionable
prescriptions, the employer would need to provide some assistance to the employee to apply for vacancies in those locations.200 As with the previous accommodation, the employer
would not be obligated to hire the employee for the position, because any interference with standard hiring practices would
impose more than de minimis costs.201
C. DOES SECTION 701(J) REQUIRE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO
ACCOMMODATE?
There may be many pharmacies that are unable to make
any reasonable accommodation without undue hardship. For
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001).
See id.
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977).
See Schmit, supra note 137.
Cf. Bruff , 244 F.3d at 501.
See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.
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example, a pharmacy may have only one pharmacist on duty
most or all of the time,202 and may have no other positions to
which a pharmacist could attempt to transfer. Under those circumstances, does the pharmacy need to make a good faith effort to accommodate the pharmacist, or may the employer terminate the pharmacist immediately? While some observers
contend that an employer must consider some accommodations,203 the case law is unsettled on this point.
In Tramm v. Porter Memorial Hospital,204 a court considered whether a hospital was required to accommodate a workroom instrument aide who objected on religious grounds to
cleaning and preparing instruments used in performing abortions.205 The court found that the hospital violated section
701(j) of Title VII because it “made no effort whatsoever to accommodate [the employee]’s religious beliefs.”206 The court observed that the hospital failed to “show that an accommodation
. . . would cause significant difficulties or costs.”207 Although
the court appeared to articulate a more rigorous standard than
the de minimis burden established under Hardison,208 the hospital’s failure to make a good faith effort to accommodate was
dispositive.209
The Seventh Circuit addressed an employer’s obligation to
make a good faith effort to accommodate in Ryan v. United
States Department of Justice.210 John Ryan, an FBI agent, refused on religious grounds to be involved with investigation of
vandalism at military recruiting facilities.211 Ryan was termi202. See Fairbank, supra note 159 (noting that many Texas pharmacies
have only one pharmacist).
203. See Massengill & Petersen, supra note 93, at 403 (“An employer’s consideration of some type of accommodation is the minimum legal requirement”).
204. No. H 87-355, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1989)
(mag. j. order).
205. See id. at *1–2.
206. Id. at *12.
207. Id. at *13.
208. Black’s Law Dictionary defines de minimis as “[t]rifling; minimal” or
“so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004). The magistrate judge’s reference
to “significant difficulties or costs,” Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at
*13 (emphasis added), reflects a higher than de minimis standard. If the hospital had made a good faith effort, the court would have had to apply the
Hardison standard more carefully.
209. See Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *12.
210. 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991).
211. Id. at 459. According to Ryan, the Roman Catholic Church required all
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nated for refusing to carry out a lawful direct order.212 The
court held that Title VII did not compel the FBI to attempt to
reassign cases, and therefore termination was appropriate:
It is difficult for any organization to accommodate employees who are
choosy about assignments; for a paramilitary organization the tension
is even greater . . . . Compelled, as it is by Title VII, to have one rule
for all of the diverse religious beliefs and practices in the United
States, the FBI may choose to be stingy with exceptions lest the demand for them overwhelm it.213

In Ryan, the court did not require the employer to make a
good faith effort to accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs.214 The employee’s refusal to accept a swap of assignments
initiated by a coworker and his failure to propose any means of
accommodation throughout the disciplinary process may have
spurred the court’s reluctance to impose an affirmative burden
on the employer to propose accommodations.215
Endres v. Indiana State Police216 presented the Seventh
Circuit with a narrower set of facts than Ryan. Benjamin Endres refused on religious grounds a work assignment to serve
as a Gaming Commission Agent at a casino and was subsequently terminated.217 Importantly, the police force offered Endres no accommodation, and the Seventh Circuit held that no
such offer was required under Title VII.218 The court noted the
unique role of public safety officers in upholding all laws and
protecting all persons from harm.219
Based on these precedents, it is difficult to ascertain
whether a pharmacy must make a good faith effort to accommodate when it has every reason to believe that each possible
accommodation either will be unreasonable, and therefore will
be rejected by the employee, or will incur more than de minimis
members to be peacemakers, thereby making it improper for him to investigate “groups that destroy governmental property to express their opposition to
violence.” Id. at 460.
212. See id. at 459–60.
213. Id. at 462.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 461 (describing employer acceptance of Ryan’s rigid position
as “capitulation rather than accommodation”).
216. 349 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2003).
217. See id. at 923.
218. See id. at 926–27 (“Certainly nothing in Ryan or Rodriguez implies
that there must be such an offer . . . . [W]e hold that [section 701(j)] does not
[require an offer of accommodation]. Endres has made a demand that it would
be unreasonable to require any police or fire department to tolerate.”).
219. See id. at 927.
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costs. If a pharmacist requests certain accommodations, as in
Tramm, courts may expect a good faith effort to explore those
possibilities.220 If a pharmacist refuses initial efforts to accommodate, as in Ryan, courts might not impose any further burden on the employer.221 While pharmacists do not play the
unique societal role of public safety officers, they do provide an
important public service in providing access to health care,222
and as a profession they enjoy a monopoly on the right to provide the public with access to certain drugs.223 Nonetheless, absence of a public safety imperative suggests that an employer
terminating a pharmacist without first making a good faith effort to accommodate will not receive the favored treatment afforded to government employers in Endres and Ryan.224 If an
employee dismisses the proposed accommodations as unreasonable, then the employer should be prepared to demonstrate
that any other accommodations will impose greater than de
minimis costs. In such cases, the employer will not violate Title
VII by terminating the refusing pharmacist.
CONCLUSION
Many pharmacies currently go beyond the legal requirements of Title VII to accommodate pharmacists who refuse to
dispense certain medications on religious grounds, and some
employers mistakenly assert that these accommodations are
required under Title VII.225 This Note demonstrates that nearly
every available reasonable accommodation imposes more than
de minimis costs on a pharmacy’s business. An employer confronted with a pharmacist, such as Neil Noesen, who refuses to

220. See Tramm v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., No. H 87-355, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16391, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1989) (mag. j. order); SOVEREIGN, supra note 95, at 75.
221. Cf. Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 459–60 (7th Cir. 1991).
222. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 233.
223. See Frank M. Archer, Emergency Contraceptives and Professional Ethics: A Critical Review, CAN. PHARM. J., May 2000, at 22, 23.
224. See Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he
employer must establish that it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate the
employee’s religious practices.”).
225. See, e.g., Barbara Polichetti, Pharmacist Refuses to Fill Contraceptive
Prescription, PROVIDENCE J. (R.I.), Aug. 11, 2005, at A1 (“As an employer . . .
we must accommodate a sincerely held religious conviction that may prevent a
pharmacist from dispensing a certain prescription.” (quoting Eileen Howard
Dunn, vice president of corporate communications and community relations
for CVS)).
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dispense drugs on religious grounds should make a good faith
effort to accommodate the pharmacist’s objections. Such efforts
may include offering career counseling to assist the pharmacist
in applying for other positions, or initiating a voluntary shiftswapping program. A pharmacy need not allow pharmacists to
transfer prescriptions to other businesses and has no obligation
to have another pharmacist on call to take over the objecting
pharmacist’s job duties. Such accommodations would alienate
customers such as Amanda Renz and impose greater than de
minimis costs on the business.
The pharmaceutical industry will continue to create drugs
to which some pharmacists object on religious grounds. Employers must anticipate that some pharmacists will object not
only to birth control, but also to Ritalin,226 Viagra for unmarried men,227 or drugs to treat AIDS;228 some pharmacists may
even object on religious grounds to serving particular customers.229
The religious discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights
Act allow most employers to dispense with the majority of possible religious accommodations for pharmacists who refuse to
fill prescriptions on religious grounds. Those provisions are
meaningless, however, if employers are reluctant to assert Title
VII’s protections against accommodations imposing an undue
hardship on the pharmacy’s business operations. As pharmacies negotiate the tensions between consumers demanding
prompt access to prescription drugs, a tight labor market for
pharmacists, pressure from certain religious groups to discourage the use of birth control, vocal national groups advocating
expanded access to contraception, and their own economic bot226. See Fairbank, supra note 159 (“Last year, a Dallas pharmacist refused
to fill a child’s prescription for Ritalin.”).
227. See Talk of the Nation: Pharmacists and Contraceptive Prescriptions
(National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 7, 2005) (quoting a listener e-mail).
228. See Sanchez, supra note 11 (“[Sarah] Stoesz, [president] of Planned
Parenthood [of Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota] said she fears
that sentiment could prompt pharmacists to deny other prescription medications, such as AIDS drugs.”).
229. See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Faith-Based
Pharmacies?: Religious Right Backs Prescription Exemptions, CHURCH & ST.,
May 2005, at 18, 18, available at http://www.au.org/site/News2?page=
NewsArticle&id=7369&abbr=cs (“Pharmacists for Life International . . . advocates refusing to fill prescriptions for people whose lifestyles offend fundamentalist religious proclivities.”); see also Stein, supra note 179 (noting that some
states are considering legislation to shield health workers from repercussions
for refusing to treat gay and lesbian clients).
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tom line, Title VII can serve either as an answer or as an excuse. Employers may use Title VII as a pretense to justify unnecessary accommodations for objecting pharmacists; pharmacies may attempt to use federal law to shield themselves from
customer and activist criticism by asserting that they have no
choice but to accommodate. On the other hand, pharmacies can
utilize Title VII as a tool to define the outer limits of their
pharmacist accommodation policies. A clear understanding of
the parameters of Title VII’s religious accommodation requirements will help guide and monitor the behavior and legal justifications presented by employers, employees, and customers
when pharmacists refuse to dispense certain drugs on religious
grounds.

